What affects unintended social inferences, and what are their consequences? My students and I study unintended inferences (Uleman & Bargh, 1989) in person perception. Like the effects of concept priming on person perception these unintended (or "spontaneous") inferences are usually unconscious. For example, when people read that "The secretary solved the mystery half-way through the book," most of them unconsciously infer that she is clever. We've demonstrated these spontaneous inferences with a variety of methods, including cued recall, lexical decision reaction times (RTs), and recognition RTs (see Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). Now that we've shown that spontaneous inferences occur, the fun has just begun because we have methods to study lots of fascinating questions, such as:
(1) What are the consequences of spontaneous inferences? In particular, how do they interact with intentional inference processes? How controllable are they, once people become aware of them? These questions are especially relevant to stereotyping and stereotypes.
(2) What are the implicit theories that govern these inferences, and perhaps underlie social categories like traits? Current research on categorization, as well as implicit theories in person perception (e.g., "entitativity," "essentialism," and "entity vs. incremental theories") are relevant.
(3) How do differences in relationships and cultures affect spontaneous inferences? We have shown that people from "individualistic" cultures are more likely to infer traits spontaneously than those from "collectivistic" cultures. What is the reason for this difference? What other difference might occur as a result of broad social contexts?
(4) How can individualism and collectivism be better measured at the individual level? We are collaborating with a half-dozen colleagues in Europe and Asia to develop measures of individualism and collectivism, focusing particularly on relationships between the individual and ingroups.